Fair Use and Faulkner

The rightsholder for the works of William Faulkner sued — twice — over infringements of their copyrights.Although the suits were originally poo-poohed, the question asked by the two suits — what are the limits of fair use — is a question that has long plagued copyright holders and infringers alike. Maybe, just maybe, we’ll get a new signpost on the road map to determine what does and does not constitute fair use of a copyrighted work.

The copyrights for the works of William Faulkner, who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1949 and died in July, 1962, are handled by Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC, which filed suits against Sony Pictures Classics, Inc. and Northrop Grumman, Inc., a defense contractor, in two different Mississippi federal district courts in October 2012. In both cases, the rightsholder contends that the defendants should have asked them for a license to use Faulkner’s material. Both defendants respond that the cases are frivolous and their use is covered by the fair use doctrine. Sony may have a leg to stand on there, but Northrop Grumman is a defense contractor who ran an ad using Faulkner’s materials in a way that the rightsholder would not have consented to. Is that fair use, too? We shall see….

Viagra Patent No Good in Canada

Pfizer wrote a patent application for one of its drugs and prosecuted it through to issuance in Canada. However, in that patent application, Pfizer’s Canadian patent attorneys/agents evidently failed to disclose the best mode of making and using the invention by “…failing to identify the active compound in the drug.” The drug is Viagra, a popular and profitable drug that enhances male sexual performance.

While this ruling is under Canadian patent law, this is a cautionary tale to all who seek patent protection. You must disclose the best mode of making and using the invention pursuant to 35 USC 112, Paragraph 1. The America Invents Act does not change that requirement.

It will be interesting to see what happens to the US patent for Viagra in the face of the Canadian ruling.

Copyright Alert System

Huh. Isn’t this interesting. The ISPs are initiating a six-strike system to help enforce copyright.

I’m glad to see the ISPs getting involved more proactively in the enforcement of copyright. The internet is a wonderful invention, but it does lend itself to infringement. Copying without permission is very, very easy in this online world, but that copying may infringe the rights of others. That’s how the recording industry made $millions from the “free” downloading of protected music.

Apple v. Samsung Reversed and Remanded

According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction against the sale of the Samsung Galaxy Nexus pursuant to a patent infringement suit currently before that court.

The CAFC’s decision cements the process for determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue. According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the traditional four factors of whether a preliminary injunction should issue “apply with equal force to the Patent Act.” Id. at 391. Those factors are:

  1. The movant is likely to succeed on the merits of his case;
  2. The movant risks suffering irreparable harm if the injunction does not issue, though the CAFC has held that a patent infringement plaintiff must also show that the harm is sufficiently connected to the infringement, the relevant question being to what extent the harm suffered can be ascribed to the alleged infringement;
  3. The balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and
  4. The injunction is in the public interest.

Here, the CAFC held that the District Court abused its discretion because there is an insufficient proof of any nexus between the infringing features and the sales of the Samsung Galaxy Nexus. Thus, any irreparable harm suffered by Apple cannot be ascribed to Samsung’s alleged infringement of the patent in question.

Starbarks and Starbucks: A Story of a Trademark Problem

Starbucks objects to the name of a new dog daycare facility outside of Chicago. Starbarks is evidently too similar to Starbucks for the coffee chain. They’ve sent a cease-and-desist letter threatening legal action unless the owner changes the name post haste.

Andrea McCarthy-Grzybek, who co-owns the Illinois facility, can’t afford to pursue the case in court, so she, having just launched her business, says she will comply and change the name, even though she insists that any resemblance to the Starbucks name is merely coincidental.

Trademark infringement is determined by a series of factors which descend from Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), specifically: “…the strength of his make, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities–the court may have to take still other variables into account.” Every circuit court of appeals in the US has adopted its own very similar list of factors that it looks at for trademark infringement claims.

If I were the judge deciding this case under Polaroid, I would analyze this as follows:

1. Strength of the mark: Starbucks is an arbitrary mark, which is strong; an arbitrary mark is a mark that uses existing words to mean something entirely out of the context of the meaning of the word or words. Furthermore, the Starbucks mark is famous; Starbarks is more suggestive for the services provided; dogs bark, this is a dog day care facility, which makes Starbarks a more suggestive mark, which is weaker than an arbitrary mark. This factor leans toward Starbucks.

2. Similarity between the two marks: Starbucks vs. Starbarks has two letters’ difference. That’s pretty similar. Furthermore, Starbucks has as one of its logos an oval or circle with the word STARBUCKS in the top side of the rim, a star on each side of the word, and COFFEE in the lower portion of the rim, with a stylized face inside; This logo, although color is not a registered part of it, is generally shown in green and white. Compare that to the logo shown on the poster made by Starbarks, shown here. To my eye, these two marks are disturbingly similar, leaning this factor toward Starbucks.

3. Proximity of the products. Coffee … doggie day care. Not similar at all. This leans toward Starbarks.

4. Likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap. Is it really likely that Starbucks, known for its coffee and related products, actually going into the dog-walking business? Probably not. This leans toward Starbarks.

5. Actual confusion: We know of no one who has actually confused Starbucks and Starbarks; if it is indeed the case that no consumer actually confused the two businesses, this factor leans toward Starbarks.

6. Reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark: Ms. McCarthy-Grzybek insists that any resemblance to the Starbucks name and logo is merely coincidental. If that’s true, her good faith is large, which would lean toward Starbarks; if, as Starbucks would very likely maintain if the case were to go to court, this factor would lean toward Starbucks.

7. Quality of defendant’s product: We know nothing of the quality of the dog-sitting service Ms. McCarthy-Grzybek provides. Assuming it’s of a reasonable quality, this factor would lean toward Starbarks; if she neglects the dogs or otherwise does not perform her duties in the way a reasonable dog-sitter would do, it would lean toward Starbucks.

8. Sophistication of the buyers: Both companies have the upscale general public for customers. The courts have repeatedly held that the general public is not a sophisticated buyer. This factor leans toward Starbucks.

Solely on the Polaroid analysis, Starbarks, the Doggie Daycare, could win. However, there’s another prong to a trademark infringement suit. Because the Starbucks mark can easily be proved to be famous, the spectre of trademark dilution raises its ugly head. Starbucks, once it shows its mark is famous, has standing to prevent anyone, no matter how disparate the product or service, from using a mark that is similar to its own. The logic behind that is that since a famous mark is so well known among consumers, those consumers automatically assume that a mark that is similar to a famous mark is affiliated with the owner of the famous mark regardless of the product or service being sold.

Frankly, I don’t see much hope for Starbarks under the dilution doctrine. It is wise of Starbarks’ owner to decide that changing the name and the logo of the doggie daycare business to something that does not come anywhere close to Starbucks’ name and logo is the way to go.

Quote of the Decade

“I’m alone and outgunned, scared and inexperienced, but I’m right.”
–John Grisham, The Rainmaker (emphasis added)

I find this quote apropos to a litigation I’m currently handling. When the opposing counsel’s 50-cal cannon booms, that cannon has shot off only one round, and now it must be reloaded. I, on the other hand, have a six-shooter; I can get off six shots to their one.

And my client is in the right.

Google and Publishers Settle Their Suit

Well this part of the suit against the Google Library Project is done. The American Association of Publishers (AAP) has settled with Google.

Google, as you may know, took on the ambitious project of digitizing libraries to make that content available online. The Google Books site provides book excerpts for free. Not unexpectedly, this project really bothered copyright owners, and the AAP, the Author’s Guild, photographers and visual artists and several individuals filed suit to stop the project in 2005.

Although the full terms of the AAP settlement are confidential, the settlement, importantly, allows publishers to opt in or out of Google Books, and thus in or out of the digitization project.

The AAP settlement still does not resolve the authors’ separate suits, which are still pending in the Southern District of New York, still presided over by Judge Chin (sitting by designation after his elevation to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals).

America Invents Act Takes Hold

At 12:01 am on 16 September 2012, seven new provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 went into effect. The new rules are intended to streamline the patent application process and introduce new procedures to ensure patent quality, spur innovation and grow the economy.

The rules that went into effect include:

  • The Oath and/or Declaration finally allows an assignee, rather than an inventor, to file a patent application;
  • Inter partes review, post-grant review, and the transitional program for covered business method patents give third parties timely and cost-effective alternatives to federal litigation to challenge the patentability of an issued patent;
  •  Applicants can now submit additional information relevant to the patentability of an issued patent to the Office; this new procedure may protect the patent from an inequitable conduct charge;
  •  The citation of prior art and written statements provision now enable the Office to treat the patent claims consistently with the patent owner’s representation of its claims to the courts or in other Office proceedings.

These steps are just the beginning: look for the first-to-file requirement to go into effect in 2013; that will be huge.

Parsing the Patent SHIELD Act

The bill introducing the Saving High-tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (Patent SHIELD Act, H.R. 6245) attempts to bring a “loser pays” system for software and hardware patent lawsuits, purportedly to protect startups from plaintiffs that want to force settlements through the threat of high legal bills. The Patent SHIELD Act was introduced by Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Jason Chaffetz (R-UT).

The bill introduces a new 35 U.S.C. 285A, which reads, in relevant part:

“(a) In General- Notwithstanding section 285, in an action disputing the validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware or software patent, upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award the recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable attorney’s fees, other than the United States.”

Hmmm. Let’s parse this one.

  • “Notwithstanding section 285…” Section 285 allows the court to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party “in exceptional cases.” I guess any litigation surrounding a computer software or hardware patent is now supposed to be an “exceptional case.” That’s … odd. What about the startups whose product or service does involve patents but does not involve computer patents?
  • “upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding…” Um … when is this determination made? At the time of the complaint? At the time of the verdict? Somewhere in the middle? A plaintiff, up until now, could bring a lawsuit in good faith, regardless of whether the suit ultimately won or lost; now, legitimately aggrieved plaintiffs have to worry about whether losing a suit is the contingency that brings costs and attorneys’ fees into play for them? That chills the blood of the legitimately aggrieved plaintiff, to put it mildly, which has the effect of eviscerating the patent enforcement system, since a plaintiff who worries that his/her costs will be increased dramatically by losing his/her legitimate suit through the award of costs and attorneys’ fees won’t even start the process.
  •   Nowhere does the bill allow the prevailing plaintiff — the legitimate patentee — to recover costs and fees, which makes this bill extraordinarily one-sided.

The gentle, bipartisan language at the start of this new bill thus masks a bill that, if it becomes law, has the potential to punish a legitimate plaintiff who makes a good-faith decision to litigate the infringement of a legitimate patent.

While I absolutely agree that patent trolls need to go away, I think this is absolutely not the way to achieve that end.